Strengthening the State : Logging and neoliberal politics in East New Britain, Papua New Guinea by Tammisto, Tuomas
Suomen Antropologi: Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society 
35(1) Spring 2010 
PO Box 59, 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland
43
STRENGTHENING THE STATE 
LOGGING AND NEOLIBERAL POLITICS  
IN EAST NEW BRITAIN, PAPUA NEW GUINEA
• TUOMAS TAMMISTO • 
ABSTRACT
 ..............................................................................................................................................
In this paper I will examine how logging in Papua New Guinea affects the 
relationship between the state and the local communities on whose lands 
logging operations take place. The point of departure of my argument is the Ili-
Wawas Integrated Project, a combined logging and agricultural project which 
seeks to bring economic development to the remote Pomio district of East New 
Britain Province by connecting existing logging roads to the limited national 
road network around the provincial capital. Developing the national road 
network and creating standardized or—to use James Scott’s concept—legible 
environments can be seen as an integral part of state-making and strengthening 
the role of the state. In addition to the environment, the state also needs to 
make social life legible in forms of maps, censuses and laws. As I will argue in 
my paper, the Ili-Wawas, and other similar projects, may indeed strengthen the 
role of the state not only by creating the infrastructure and legibility needed by 
the state, but also in unintended and accidental ways. The side effects of logging 
and road building include, among others, fear of crime and land disputes. It is 
these that create among the locals a perceived need for state institutions, which 
may be as signiﬁcant in advancing the role of the state as is the creation of 
infrastructure and legibility.
 ..............................................................................................................................................
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Introduction1
How are commercial projects related to logging, such as road-building and the 
establishment of oil-palm plantations, connected to state-making and strengthening the 
state in Papua New Guinea? I examine this question in the context of the southern Wide 
Bay area, a border area inhabited by the relatively small groups of Sulka and Mengen 
peoples.2 The Wide Bay area on the eastern coast of New Britain island is located in the 
Pomio district of East New Britain province. Out of the province’s four districts Pomio 
is by far the largest, but has the smallest and most sparsely distributed population. In 
addition to this, the Pomio district is fairly isolated in terms of geography. With its still 
relatively large forest cover and the rugged Nakanai mountains, the district is hard to 
traverse. The regional centers of Pomio, for example Pomio and Palmalmal villages, are 
not connected to the national road network around the provincial capital of Rabaul. 
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Moreover, while located only some 150 kilometers from the provincial capital, the Wide 
Bay area can only be reached by boat. 
Despite being geographically isolated, the Wide Bay region, like the Pomio district 
in general, is far from untouched. On the contrary, the ﬁrst plantations were set up 
in the region shortly prior to the First World War (Panoff 1969: 3); foreign logging 
companies came to the area in the 1980’s, and large scale operations began in earnest, 
with the consent of local landowners, in the 1990s.3 The ﬁrst logging companies to arrive 
were Japanese, I was told, but from the 1990s most of the logging in the Wide Bay area 
has been conducted by Niu Gini Lumber, a subsidiary of the Malaysian logging giant 
Rimbunan Hijau. The Sulka and the Mengen of the Wide Bay area gain their livelihood 
mostly from swidden horticulture and are in many ways self-sufﬁcient in terms of food 
and housing. Monetary income comes from logging compensations and through migrant 
labor in other parts of country, for example on plantations. Indeed, a striking feature of 
the village in which I conducted my ﬁeldwork was the relatively small number of young 
men, because many worked in other provinces. Small-scale cash cropping of cocoa is 
also central to monetary income and many households cultivate cocoa along with their 
subsistence crops. However, according to local people and politicians alike, the lack 
of proper connections to the regional centers diminishes the income gained from cash 
cropping because a part of the produce rots while waiting for the irregular ship transports 
to Rabaul.
In order to change this, Pomio’s MP and a current cabinet minister, Mr. Paul Tiensten—a 
Mengen man from the small village of Wawas—has devised a new development initiative, 
the Pomio Economic Development Strategy (PEDS) 2005–2012. The PEDS seeks to 
“harness the potential of Pomio by triggering the private sector including ordinary people 
(…) to become productively engaged and the mobilization and alignment of land, labor 
and ﬁnancial resources to support the development of integrated agro-forestry projects” 
(Oimop Nius n.d.: 2). In short, the program seeks to develop the remote and geographically 
isolated areas of East New Britain by connecting them to the provincial capitals of East 
and West New Britain and intensifying company presence in the area by establishing oil-
palm plantations for instance. 
While not connected to the national road network that extends as far as the village of 
Ili, there are numerous logging roads in Pomio that connect logging sites with the coast, 
but also smaller villages with each other (see MAP 1). The whole program is based on the 
Ili-Wawas road connection, which is to be built by logging companies who, in exchange 
for logging concessions, will connect the existing isolated logging roads with the national 
network around the capital. Logging is to be followed up by the establishment of oil-palm 
plantations and smallholder estates, which should ensure the maintenance of the roads. 
As such, the PEDS seems to be a prime example of a neoliberal development project, in 
as much as the building and maintenance of state infrastructure is shifted onto private 
companies. The plan, while widely supported by the inhabitants of Wide Bay, also has 
its opponents, especially among national and local conservationists, who argue that the 
views of local communities have not been taken sufﬁciently into account, that oil-palm 
plantations will severely damage the environment as well as subsistence agriculture, and 
that the whole process has been fast-tracked by Mr. Tiensten (Iko-Forestri Nius 2006: 1).
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in their respective communities. Along with these, teachers and local land mediators 
also represent the state. The latter are appointed by the Local Level Governments (LLG) 
to mediate disputes over land. Local land mediators are not allowed to make decisions, 
but they facilitate compromise agreements between the disputing parties. Thus, for most 
of the time, it is the villagers themselves who represent the state; moreover, the state is 
constituted in certain forms of relationships between the villagers. At times—for example 
during elections—the state’s presence is increased when politicians come to their home 
villages to vote and polling stations accompanied by police ofﬁcers are also established in 
the more remote villages. 
Besides bringing economic development to the remote, and admittedly poor, areas 
of Pomio district, the Ili-Wawas road project, along with the PEDS in general, can also 
be seen as an attempt to strengthen the role of the state in the area. James Scott has 
argued in his book Seeing Like a State (1998) that government control relies on what he 
calls the creation of legibility. The sovereignty of the modern state lies in the control of 
its territory (Neocleous 2003: 411). However, this control is not only based on the use 
of violence over which the state claims monopoly, but also on the administration and 
cognitive control of space. The administrative interest of the state is visible in its need 
for a standardized and what James Scott calls a “legible” environment, like standardized 
citizens (populations) and an administrable social life (laws) (Scott 1998: 22). Legibility 
then is based on the abstraction of reality that is in itself too complex and heterogeneous 
for the state to manage (Scott 1998: 30). 
However, legibility is not only created on the conceptual, but also on the physical 
level. In a very concrete way this process of abstraction is visible in the “scientiﬁc forestry” 
originating in eighteenth-century Prussia (Scott 1998: 12). At ﬁrst the abstraction was 
conducted on a conceptual level by “ignoring” those aspects of the forest that were not 
economically interesting, but the logical outcome was that actual forest came to be 
managed in this way (Scott 1998: 13, 15). The resulting product was a monocultural 
and evenly-aged forest, a “neatly arranged construct (…) of science” (Scott 1998: 15). 
According to Scott (1998: 14) this process has to be seen as a part of a larger context, 
namely that of centralized state-making. 
Referring to Scott, Dan Jorgensen (2007: 61) notes that the creation of legibility is 
a “precondition of the implementation of state plans” and that legibility enables “the 
systematic state intervention in the affairs of its citizens”. As noted, along with conceptual 
abstractions, such as maps, the concrete refashioning of the environment is also an 
integral part of creating legibility and thus creating the basis for state control. Thus I will 
examine the Ili-Wawas project not only as a way of furthering development, much hoped 
for by both local villagers as politicians alike, but also as a means of creating the legible 
environments needed by the state. 
Indeed, road networks are prime examples of legible ‘national grids’, just as plantations 
are standardized environments. But do private companies, which in the case of Ili-Wawas 
are given the actual task of producing road networks and plantations, in fact create these 
kinds of environments? In what ways do such projects advance the role of the state? In the 
discussion below I shall focus on different aspects of road-building in East New Britain 
and examine the ways road connections enhance the role of the state in remote areas. As 
the mapping of territories as well as land disputes and their resolution are intimately tied 
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to the development project and are further examples of the creation of legibility, these 
issues also receive some attention in the following discussion. 
Road-building
Roads and road-building are important things to bear in mind when discussing the 
re-modeling of the environment. The signiﬁcance of roads is easily forgotten in places 
where they are taken for granted and where they are an integral and almost natural (or 
naturalized) part of the landscape. Furthermore, roads are also necessary for any kind of 
natural resource extraction and they are an essential part of the infrastructure needed both 
by the state and corporations. Roads reform in a very concrete fashion the environment 
into a legible grid, which according to Scott (1998: 4) is essential for the functioning of 
states. Moreover, road-building is a way of connecting certain areas and bringing them 
more closely under the control of the state. As James Ferguson (1996: 253) has shown, 
road-building is not just a technical operation, it has substantial political effects. Ferguson 
uses as an example a seemingly unsuccessful development project operating in Lesotho 
during the 1980s. The project did not meet its goals, but through technical improvements 
such as roads and other services the area in question was tied more closely to the state; for 
example, the road made the area more accessible to military forces, whose presence in the 
area indeed increased (Ferguson 1996: 253). In East New Britain roads are important in 
questions concerning the state, landownership and sometimes even ethnicity.
In the Pomio district, roads form a peculiar private infrastructure. As with the state, 
whose presence is not total but not really absent either, the roads in Pomio do not form an 
all-encompassing grid; but again like the state, they are not fully absent but rather located 
here and there, so to speak. Around the provincial capital of Kokopo there is a growing 
road network that does not, however, reach very far into other parts of East New Britain 
(see MAP 1). There are roads elsewhere in province as well but they are not connected 
to the limited network around Kokopo, or to anything else for that matter. Most of 
the roads in East New Britain are not built by the government but by private logging 
companies such as the Malaysian Rimbunan Hijau operating in the Baining areas (Fajans 
1998: 20) and its subsidiaries like Niu Gini Lumber operating in Pomio. These roads 
seem to run from nowhere to nowhere though they do connect the coast with logging 
areas and often pass through small villages. This network is only temporary: after logging 
operations cease in a given area, road maintenance is abandoned by the company and they 
are easily damaged by the heavy rains of the wet season. Company-built bridges suffer the 
same fate and are often washed away when rivers ﬂood. Even though the locals use the 
roads where convenient, they almost exclusively serve the companies operating in an area. 
They are a private infrastructure built for a single purpose, namely the transportation 
of timber, and thus very different from the road networks built by states, although in 
practice government roads in PNG are not always much better. 
The road network around the capital and the generally more developed infrastructure in 
the Tolai areas (to the north on the Gazelle Peninsula) are legacies of colonialism, because 
the administrative areas and the majority of plantations were and still are located there. 
Otherwise the government infrastructure could be conceptualized as simple ‘punctuation’ 
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because its presence is limited to certain areas—rather like dots on a map. There are aid-
posts, schools and occasional police stations in larger centers but their somewhat haphazard 
location hardly forms a grid. The geography of Papua New Guinea, with its mountains 
and archipelagos, makes the building of grid-like infrastructure difﬁcult. During colonial 
days much of the country was administered by government patrols walking from village 
to village, rather than remaining in one place (Schieffelin and Crittenden 1991: 13). The 
villages often had houses where colonial ofﬁcials could stay during their visits (haus kiap 
in Tok Pisin), but these were empty or in other use most of the time. The ﬁrst police 
post in the Mengen areas was set up only shortly before WWII in Pomio; prior to that 
the areas were administered from a distance of over 150 kilometers by sea from Pomio 
(Panoff 1969: 3). Much of PNG’s infrastructure is still literally punctuation, because due 
to the lack of roads transportation still relies on airplanes that land on airstrips cleared in 
the forests.
Bringing in the state 
In Ferguson’s account of road-building in Lesotho the roads appear as mere by-products 
of development projects and advance the grip of the state almost imperceptibly. The 
situation in East Pomio is very different. Road-building has for a long time been an 
explicitly political question among the inhabitants of rural East New Britain. In some 
cases, the question of road-building is tied to land issues and even relations between 
ethnic groups. Jane Fajans (1998: 20), for instance, describes how the Baining, an ethnic 
group living in the northern parts of East New Britain—closer to the capital Kokopo than 
the Mengen areas—have for some time been opposing a proposed road link that would 
connect them to the provincial capital. In East New Britain the largest ethnic group, the 
Tolai, who live around the provincial capital on the Gazelle Peninsula, have the greatest 
political and bureaucratic inﬂuence in the province, but are short of land. The Gazelle 
Peninsula of New Britain was colonized during the nineteenth century and much of the 
land area has been alienated from the Tolais for plantations and the mission—ﬁrst by 
the Germans and then by the Australians (Sillitoe 2000: 79). According to Paul Sillitoe 
(2000: 79), the Tolais have lost nearly 50 percent of the land area that originally belonged 
to them. Because of the land shortage, according to Fajans (1998: 20), there is constant 
demographic pressure from Kokopo towards the southern parts of New Britain. The 
Baining have sold rights to logging companies to work on their land and, as a result, 
private logging infrastructure also exists in Baining areas. The Baining have viewed these 
roads positively, precisely because they do not connect to a wider network and therefore 
the threat of Tolai settlers is signiﬁcantly lessened (Fajans 1998: 20). During my ﬁeldwork, 
I was told that there is still opposition to the Ili-Wawas plans among the Baining.
Road-building and the Ili-Wawas project were also central political questions much 
debated by the inhabitants themselves, and the focus of great attention during the 2007 
national elections in which Mr. Tiensten managed to retain his seat with a majority of 
votes. Many of the Mengen with whom I talked were in favor of the road link, since it 
was hoped that a road to Kokopo would ease the ﬁnancial situation, because it would 
enable agricultural products from the villages as well as cash crops to be transported 
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to the markets. Despite the largely positive attitudes, however, many people were also 
afraid that the new road would produce social problems by attracting raskols4 and other 
suspicious people from the towns. Some villagers were highly critical of company-built 
roads, because of their limited durability and the government’s suspected inability and 
unwillingness to maintain them when they were abandoned for commercial purposes. 
Furthermore, since the villagers do not have cars and will not be able to afford them 
in the near future, roads and their maintenance were seen by some as a useless waste 
of money. For these reasons a certain village minority explicitly supports the present 
restricted patchwork-infrastructure and the continued reliance on boats which are used 
for travel both to nearby villages and to larger regional centers; they are thus perceived by 
some as an independent form of transportation:
There are other and cheaper alternatives to get development that don’t pose any danger to us. Like 
the improvement of ports. We could use only sea-transport and short distance roads  [to the ports], 
like we here in [our village].5 (male, 37)
Most of the people with whom I talked, however, wanted the road connection for its 
potential economic beneﬁts, while being at the same time highly aware of the possible 
problems. In fact most people supporting the road connection also hoped for a 
concurrently stronger government presence in the area. Unlike in Ferguson’s (1996: 254) 
account, where roads instigated tighter government control as a sort of by-product of 
development, this was an explicit goal amongst the people of Wide Bay:
They should ﬁrst build a police station before linking the road [to the town].This way the police 
could be here to drive out all the criminals [lit. “bad men”]. We can’t do that, because we are too 
afraid of them. (woman, 47)6
Indeed, the main worry seems to be that the roads will not bring with them government 
control, but just the violence and troubles from towns. On the other hand, the police do 
not always prevent violence and all too often may be the perpetrators of it. For example, 
a conservation activist from the Lote people (Pomio district, south of the Mengen areas) 
told me that he was assaulted and badly beaten by policemen, who were, according to 
him, acting on behalf of a logging company. People from the village in which I was 
situated spoke about an incident where some armed policemen had threatened villagers 
who were opposed to logging. 
Logging roads and patchwork infrastructure
When describing how states create standardized and legible environments, James Scott 
(1998: 8) also notes that large-scale capitalism has the same effects. According to Scott 
(1998: 12), scientiﬁc forestry which “saw” the forests from a purely utilitarian and 
economic point of view served “the direct needs of the state”. This way of “seeing” is even 
more typical of logging companies which see the environment from an even narrower 
economic point of view than most states. And indeed, in the case of Ili-Wawas, the task of 
building infrastructure for the state is handed over to private companies interested mainly 
in the extraction of timber.
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But do companies in fact create the same kind of standardized environment and 
infrastructure as states? In East Pomio the company infrastructure is as narrow in its uses 
as the point of view which produced it. The roads are temporary and they form isolated 
grids in the areas of interest to the companies. In response to Scott, James Ferguson 
(2005: 379) has argued that neoliberal capitalism in fact does not produce national 
grids, but enclaves and “patchworks”. Indeed, capital does not ﬂow, but it hops from 
one usable area to another, skipping the unusable in between (Ferguson 2005: 380). 
Ferguson’s description of oil-companies in Africa seems generally applicable also to logging 
companies in East Pomio. In fact, keeping in mind that PNG’s national infrastructure 
has always been of a punctuating kind, it could be said that contemporary Africa—as 
described by James Ferguson—is shifting from imperial networks characterized by rail-
roads (for example Ferguson 1999: 2) and government control to the punctuating or 
patchwork-infrastructure characteristic of PNG. Until now the logging companies have 
created what seem to be enclaves, even though of a much less extreme form than the 
oil-enclaves in Africa or Iraq protected by razor wire, armed guards or even mercenaries 
(Ferguson 2005: 381). The logging-road networks spread out around company base 
camps, leaving other areas off the grid. Some Mengen villagers were very critical about 
this private infrastructure, describing the roads as mere tracks that will be washed away 
by rains in six months. 
The infrastructure situation in East Pomio and other parts of East New Britain is 
less clear-cut than the scenario described by Ferguson (2005). The logging-company 
infrastructure resembles in many ways the enclave-like infrastructure of oil-companies, 
but with the Ili-Wawas plan there seems to be a trade-off between companies and the 
state, in so far as the companies get logging concessions for which they still need the 
approval of traditional landowners, while the state gets desired infrastructure at a fraction 
of the cost it would have to pay if it were to build the infrastructure alone. But the 
companies and infrastructure do not advance the control of the state just by making the 
areas more accessible, rather the infrastructure itself creates a need for the state and its 
security-providing institutions, as the comment by the Mengen man above illustrates. 
Furthermore, the poor quality of the company-built roads has raised the hope that the 
state might provide better services. An older Sulka man points out that the government, 
not the companies, should build the roads, because the government would be committed 
to maintaining them:
The road link... The company, they do not build the bridges very well. They just cut down trees and 
put them over the river. It is not the government; if it were, it would build it well. The company, they 
are not able to do it right. (…) The government will build good [roads], because they keep working 
on them all the time.7 (man, 69)
 
As noted, the majority seems to support the PEDS development project, especially given 
the fact that Mr. Tiensten retained his seat in the parliamentary elections of 2007 with a 
large majority. However, not all local people see logging as desirable and have sought to 
conserve their land areas as Wildlife Management Areas (WMA) as I will discuss in the 
following section.
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Mapping
The legibility of the environment and people is not just based on physical modiﬁcations 
of the environment, but crucially rests on conceptual abstractions such as maps. As Scott 
(1998: 45) has noted, maps “make the local situation legible to an outsider”. Maps—
highly abstracted and the information they hold reduced to a very great extent—allow 
quick surveying of the tracts in question (Scott 1998: 44). Interestingly, development 
programs based on logging in the Wide Bay area not only create legible environments 
in the form of roads, but also enhance social legibility in the form of mapping, although 
indirectly. As mentioned above, not all inhabitants of Wide Bay support logging and some 
landholding clans among the Sulka and Mengen have decided to conserve their lands in 
the form of a Wildlife Management Area, a locally controlled conservation area. In order 
to facilitate this project in the village where I conducted ﬁeldwork, one clan had decided 
to map the area intended for conservation to avoid future disputes and uncertainties. 
The mapping was performed with the help of a Papua New Guinean NGO using the 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) toolkit developed in order to “enable development 
practitioners, government ofﬁcials, and local people to work together to plan context-
appropriate programs” (World Bank 1996: 191)
According to one NGO worker an objective was also to ascertain whether members 
of all the clans were in favour of the conservation project and not just the clan who 
had invited the NGO to facilitate it. The idea was to create a community map showing 
clan land and village boundaries and then to ensure that all the clans in question agreed 
on the result. In order to get all the villagers participating, the map was ﬁrst drafted 
onto the ground using local materials such as sticks and stones to represent various 
geographic and social elements such as rivers, gardens and abandoned villages. The point 
of PRA is that while NGO workers explain and facilitate the process, the actual map is 
ostensibly produced by the villagers themselves. According to the NGO worker who 
had been conducting the PRA in the village, participation is at ﬁrst slow and women in 
particular often refrain from taking part, but as the mapping progresses, people start to 
speak out and correct things that they perceive as mistakes. The map is completed when 
all the villagers agree on it. Afterwards, the map is conﬁrmed by physically walking the 
boundaries and only then is it transferred to paper and sometimes even conﬁrmed with 
GPS (Global Positioning System). The ﬁnished document should go back to the villagers 
themselves.
Even this kind of participatory mapping, however, is not entirely unproblematic, 
because it ‘ﬁxes’ a certain situation in time—like a still picture of a ﬂowing river, to 
borrow Scott’s (1998: 46) metaphor. As noted by the NGO worker who had coordinated 
the work, when the ownership of clan lands is thoroughly researched and documented, 
it also shows who in the community does not own land and other resources: “It gives a 
clear picture of all the people who do not have land, just user rights to it”8 (Papua 
New Guinean NGO-worker, female, 50).
There is, therefore, a concomitant danger that property relations can become unduly 
highlighted and even fetishized, and user rights be forgotten or diminish in importance. 
As Stuart Kirsch (2006: 203) has noted with regard to the Yonggom mapping of their 
territories with GPS technology, ﬁxing indigenous land boundaries to universal standards 
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may dissolve ﬂexible local practices of re-organizing land relations according to demographic 
shifts and other local dynamics. Power relations inside a given community also link up 
to maps and mapping because maps require a certain kind of knowledge to be read and 
understood. They are in a way part of the state’s “code” (Scott 1998: 36), often legible 
only to the educated in local communities. Also related to the fear of ﬁxing indigenous 
land relations by documenting them is the concern, often expressed by anthropologists, 
that mapping of indigenous lands is the ﬁrst step in the commodiﬁcation and registration 
of territory, leading ultimately to the alienation of people from their lands.
Interestingly, it was those most opposed to logging who actively wanted to make their 
situation legible to the state through community mapping. Mapping, whether performed 
by states, companies or NGOs, is a double-edged sword for the locals. It makes the 
situation legible for outsiders (Scott 1998: 45), it ﬁxes ﬂuid relations and “fuzzy” 
boundaries on paper, it separates propertied tracts from others (Abramson 2000: 15), 
but it also is often the only tool powerful enough to confront companies or even states 
themselves. Then there is the additional problem of whose maps the government actually 
reads. Those clan members who wanted to conserve their traditional land areas were 
disappointed to discover that despite their efforts their lands were nevertheless mapped as 
logging areas in the Ili-Wawas project, even though they had deliberately tried to make 
their situation legible to the state (the sequel to this story is further discussed below). 
True, maps can negatively ﬁx ﬂexible relations and commodify traditional lands, 
but so do timber concessions sold to large multinational companies. And indeed, the 
transformations inscribed by large scale logging on the environment are more or less 
ﬁxed as well, since regeneration takes a long time, or is impossible if logging is followed 
by plantations. Then it is not maps as “technologies of power” (Abramson 2000: 16) that 
make property out of traditional lands, but rather the deals with the companies; when 
these deals are made according to ﬂuid traditional boundaries, the end result is also ﬂuid 
and timber might be harvested in areas that people want to preserve. In East New Britain 
disputes seem indeed to be a very common consequence of logging and other similar 
development projects, though it must be noted that such disputes enhance legibility from 
the centre and even drive local people to support state institutions to a greater extent than 
before. 
Disputes and social legibility
Among the Sulka-Mengen, land is communally owned—or more precisely held—by 
local matrilineal descent groups, that is, clans and subclans that belong to two moieties. 
Individual clans—and often also subclans—hold a certain area of land, an ownership 
that is recognized by the clans and subclans holding neighbouring areas. The moieties, 
clans and subclans are also strictly exogamous, while post-marital residence is not strictly 
regulated and a married couple is rather free to choose their place of residence. Due to 
the strict exogamy and freedom of residence, clans are very dispersed in their membership 
and few people actually live on their clan lands. In practice, it seems, user rights to land 
have traditionally and until recently been more important and elaborated than questions 
about actual ownership. People gain user rights to land through a number of different 
Suomen Antropologi: Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society 1/2010 53
TUOMAS TAMMISTO
relationships, such as afﬁnal or patrilineal ties or residence in a particular village—in 
other words, through membership in different kinds of groups. 
In order for a logging company to be able to legally log an area, it needs to get the 
permission of the local landowners. In Papua New Guinea practically all land (97–99 per 
cent of the land area depending on the source) is communally owned by the traditional 
landowners under the so called customary land title (Filer and Sekhran 1998: 30). In 
the legislation, the customary land groups are often deﬁned as clans but they are not 
further speciﬁed (Department of Lands and Physical Planning 2005). This means that 
in many cases, the state (or company) does not ‘know’ who actually owns a given tract of 
land. Despite this, customary groups are legal entities, who can, for example, sell logging 
concessions to companies, but are not allowed to alienate land. In order to clarify the 
situation and facilitate land management by local groups, the Land Group Incorporation 
Act (LGIA) was passed in 1974. This legislation seeks to “ﬁnd” groups that “already have a 
corporate identity under custom” and incorporate them (Fingleton 2007: 28, 27). While, 
as such, an innovative piece of legislation, the LGIA has been criticised because rather 
than facilitating land management, it is said to have become a mechanism for distributing 
compensations, that it reiﬁes custom and that it has been ‘captured’ by heavy industries 
such as logging and mining in order to help them in making deals with local groups 
(Fingleton 2007: 31–34). Clearly, the LGIA is an attempt to make the local situation 
more legible to the state, even in cases where the local situation is far less clear than the 
legislation would have it (Jorgensen 2007: 61).
In addition to the incorporation of land groups, there have been several attempts to 
propose the registration of land titles, ﬁrst by the colonial government in the 1950s and 
later again in 1989 by the independent state of Papua New Guinea as a part of the 
World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) (Lakau 1997: 536; Bashkow 2006: 
284 n.13). The main idea behind the registration of titles was the belief that communal 
land ownership was inefﬁcient in terms of economic development and that registered 
titles could be used, for example, as collateral for loans (Bashkow 2006: 284 n.14). Both 
attempts were unsuccessful, the ﬁrst one due to opposition from the House of Assembly 
and the latter due to massive popular resistance and demonstrations that caused the death 
of two persons (Lakau 1997: 538). Land registration has often been seen as a mechanism 
to allow the alienation of land from its customary owners, and therefore strongly opposed 
(see for example article by the lawyer Almah Tararia [2005]). However, in March 2009, 
bills that allow the use of land as collateral were passed in PNG’s parliament (Chand 
2009), without opposition as of this writing.
The combination of compensation paid by logging companies that is high according 
to the standards of the villagers, the landholding system that makes it possible to claim 
various user rights based on different relationships, and PNG’s land legislation that is quite 
unspeciﬁc, regularly produces situations that are fertile grounds for disputes. Indeed, in 
the village in which I conducted my ﬁeldwork, most of the eleven clans represented were, 
or had recently been, involved in a dispute over land. Many disputes were minor quarrels 
over whether a particular person had the right to set up cocoa blocks on land over which 
he had user rights and so forth. Such disputes are usually short and quickly resolved at the 
village level. However, some clans were also involved in larger and longer disputes over 
parts of, or entire clan land areas. 
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Such disputes were directly connected to logging. In one case two clans were arguing 
about the ownership of a certain tract, that is, over who had the right to decide on its use 
and distribute the compensation. Another lengthy dispute had occurred in the village 
between 2000 and 2002 (brieﬂy mentioned above) when one of the clans decided not to 
allow logging on its lands and moreover mapped them with the help of an NGO in order 
to conserve them. Later the area was claimed by another clan, but the dispute was quickly 
settled at the village level with help of local land mediators—government appointed 
ofﬁcials who can help the disputing parties sign agreements but not make decisions in 
dispute cases. Later still, however, the same parts of the same area were claimed by a 
third clan who invited Niu Gini Lumber to log it. The clan intending to conserve the 
area stepped back into the fray and a long drawn out dispute resulted. Both parties were 
supported by other clans, both sought help from NGOs, and the clan in favour of logging 
had the further backing of a landowner company. In the end, after a long process, the 
District Court decided that the clan wanting to conserve the area was the traditional 
owner. No appeals were made to alter this decision.
The dispute was seen as particularly tiring and disruptive by the people involved. 
I interviewed participants from both sides as well as a local land mediator, and most 
agreed that it would be best if disputes were settled at the village level through agreed 
compromise. A member of the winning clan regretted that the matter had to be brought 
to court, but noted that the opposing party left him no alternative because it wanted to 
log traditional lands that his clan wanted to conserve. However, his younger brother—also 
active in conserving his clan lands and likewise involved in the dispute and court cases—
thought that higher-level courts were preferable when resolving village land disputes due 
to their neutrality; as outsiders, court ofﬁcials do not have a vested interest in such cases. 
He contrasted this with village-level arbitration where the local land mediators, as “men 
of the village” (man bilong ples) have their own stakes in the dispute, even if their clans are 
not directly involved. According to the younger brother, as land mediators they are able 
to gather the origin stories that are used to investigate ownership and modify their own 
versions accordingly. This same concern was also voiced by an NGO worker: 
The information you give out about your ancestors, all other people can use this information and 
twist it around. Some people are becoming clever these days. The custom of before is no more. That’s 
why people don’t like to disclose their information for fear of that.9 
(Papua New Guinean NGO-worker, female, 50)
Thus it seems that government institutions, such as courts, are gaining in popularity 
in the settlement of land disputes, a situation which parallels the expressed hope for a 
greater police presence should the road network extend to Wide Bay. Interestingly, similar 
tendencies were also to be heard in reference to the incorporation of land groups and 
even the registration of land titles. A local land mediator whom I interviewed told me 
that the ownership of most traditional land had been established in the area of the East 
Pomio Local Level Government, but that no land groups, to his knowledge, had been 
incorporated. Some Sulka clans were, however, in the process of doing so and people 
in the village where I conducted ﬁeldwork and in neighbouring villages were seriously 
contemplating the possibility of incorporation and even registration in order to end 
disputes once and for all. It was noted that once ownership is recognized by the state, that 
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is, is “in the hand of law” (i stap long han bilong lo), no further disputes would be possible. 
It seems that the inhabitants of the Wide Bay area seek recognition by the state, be it for 
their conservation projects, in order to undergo economic development or for protection 
from crime and company abuses.
Conclusion
As described above, the Ili-Wawas project and the PEDS intend to economically develop 
the remote Pomio district of East New Britain. According to the plan, logging will 
provide compensation funds to local landowners while the logging companies will build 
new (logging) roads and connect existing ones to the national network in the northern 
part of the province. Oil-palm plantations will ensure that business continues and the 
roads are taken care of after logging operations stop in the area. Moreover, the new road 
connection should enable the local population to access the market in the provincial 
capital and sell their produce there. Besides ensuring economic development, the project 
is marketed by highlighting the services the government will be able to provide once the 
remote areas are connected to the grid. James Scott’s (1998) concept of legibility has 
served as a point of departure for analysis of the political effects of the Ili-Wawas program 
because, on paper, the combined logging and oil-palm project seeks to produce precisely 
these kinds of legible environments whose creation, Scott (1998: 14) also notes, is often 
analogous with, and connected to, the project of centralized state-making. This is also 
the case with the Ili-Wawas project. Even though the roads and plantations are built by 
private companies, the state of PNG has a vested interest because it can use the private 
infrastructure as the basis of the national road network which is vital to the state’s provision 
of services and control. However, the infrastructure built by private companies is—at least 
so far—rather poor in quality, a sort of slash-and-burn infrastructure. The logging roads 
mainly serve the needs of the companies, and as noted by many people I interviewed, 
when the logging operations in a given area cease, the unattended and unpaved roads are 
all but washed away by the heavy rains. 
This does not mean that the Ili-Wawas project does not advance the role of the state. 
I argue that it indeed does, but also in different ways than intended. The people of the 
local communities in which I conducted ﬁeldwork in general support the road project 
but they are also very conscious of the problems related to it. It was agreed that if the road 
connection is built, the government should also increase its presence in the area and 
protect the locals. Some thought that the roads should be built by the government, 
because then the government would be committed to keeping the roads intact, unlike 
the companies working in the area. Furthermore, people wanting to conserve their forests 
mapped their areas with the help of NGOs and provided the provincial government with 
this information, thereby willingly trying to make their situation legible to the authorities; 
they were subsequently very disappointed when the mentioned areas were mapped for 
logging in the plans for the Ili-Wawas project. So neoliberal projects like the Ili-Wawas do 
seem to strengthen the role of the state but apparently less by providing infrastructure than 
by making state institutions seem desirable solutions to project-generated problems. 
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This is in my opinion a signiﬁcant shift. Jane Fajans (1998: 20) describes how the 
Baining, a people living north of the Mengen areas around Ili, were some ten years ago 
opposed to any attempt to connect their area with the national road network. The Baining 
were initially happy with the logging roads in their area, but did not want a connection 
to the capital, because they feared that this would lead to greater immigration of the Tolai 
people from the north to the Baining lands (Fajans 1998: 20). During my ﬁeldwork I 
heard that there was still opposition to the Ili-Wawas project in some Baining areas. In 
contrast, rather than being opposed to the project as such, or fearing that the provincial 
government controlled by the Tolais will take over their lands,10 the Mengen seemed 
explicitly to want greater co-operation with the government in order to prevent perceived 
problems. Rather than being opposed to the state, they saw it as a necessary institution 
in countering the problems that they thought were too big to handle themselves—such 
as crime, for example.
An analogous process is happening with questions about land tenure, ownership and 
disputes that the Mengen agree to be an outcome of development—logging in their 
case. In order for logging to be legal, the lumber companies need to have the consent 
of the landowning groups and compensate them accordingly. This means that the local 
landowning groups need to be speciﬁed and deﬁned, a process that Dan Jorgensen (2007: 
60) has also described as making the local situation legible to the state. Logging has 
indeed brought with it a vast number of disputes about land. Local communities and 
landowning groups dispute whether logging should be allowed on their lands at all; several 
different groups may claim a single area and so forth. According to a local land mediator 
I interviewed, the ownership of nearly all clan lands has been speciﬁed with the help of 
mediation and sometimes with the assistance of the courts. At the time of my ﬁeldwork 
no land groups were yet incorporated or titles registered. The latter in particular has 
traditionally been strongly resisted by the local landowners of PNG, because it is feared 
that the registration of land titles will be the ﬁrst step towards alienating the land from its 
traditional owners (Tararia 2005 and Lakau 1997 among others). However, people tired 
of disputes had started to contemplate the incorporation of land groups and registration. 
Similarly, a young and highly educated man who had represented his clan in a lengthy 
dispute over the ownership of a large tract of land stated that he favors higher-level courts 
for dispute settlements rather than local land mediators who are, according to him, too 
often partisan and inﬂuenced by their own interests. In his view, the state is a neutral 
party which also has the power to enforce its own decisions, as had occurred in his own 
case. While the majority of the people I talked to were in favor of local mediation and 
opposed to the registration of land titles, I think it is interesting that some people have 
ﬁxed their hopes on a governmental role in dispute resolution. 
Thomas Strong (2006: 51) has argued in reference to warfare in the Eastern Highlands 
of PNG that people are ﬁnding “means through which to govern themselves”, but that 
these means do not necessarily ﬁt the picture of efﬁcient or fair liberal governance, nor is 
it clear that the people wish to be so governed. Strong’s analysis clearly applies in the case 
of the Highlands and it is backed by other similar descriptions (for example Strathern 
and Stewart 2000). But it seems that something else may be happening in the remote 
parts of New Britain. As with the logging roads, it seems that the problems relating to 
landownership and disputes—that are an outcome of logging as well—make the state 
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as an institution more desirable for the locals. Rather than ignoring or being actively 
against the state, the local communities of Wide Bay seem to want to co-operate with the 
government. And even if this is not uniformly so, the fact that this willingness is gaining 
in popularity is highly interesting. 
Arun Agrawal (2005: 20) has noted how changes in the technologies of government also 
affect the subjectivities of the people governed. Taking his examples from Kumaon, North 
India, Agrawal shows how centralized attempts to protect the forests in Kumaon resulted 
in protest, whereas more localized forest councils got the inhabitants to participate, and 
indeed created new kinds of environmental subjectivities. Maybe the unexpectedness, 
or the sometimes even chaotic, character of neoliberal governance, where central aspects 
of services are shifted to private companies, do create new subjectivities, new needs for 
more accountable government as manifested in the hopes of the Wide Bay inhabitants for 
more stability? In all its unpredictability, with crime and company abuses, logging indeed 
seems to strengthen the state. The question however remains what kind of state is being 
strengthened? Will it indeed protect the ﬂexible ways of the local populations or emphasize 
providing a legal framework where extractive industries can work even more easily?
NOTES
..............................................................................................................................................
1  This paper is based on a three-month period of ethnographic ﬁeldwork conducted in a predominantly 
Mengen village in the southern part of Wide Bay between June and August 2007.
2 The Sulka and Mengen number about 4,000 and 10,000 people respectively, an estimate that I base 
on the information provided by the Summer Institute of Linguistics (Gordon [ed.] 2005). Both peoples, 
at least in the border area, see each other as culturally closely related. Intermarriages are common and 
both share a similar social structure based on a number of exogamous clans and two moieties. I was told 
that Sulka and Mengen clans, while separate in terms of leaders and land holding, correspond to each 
other. However, linguistically the two groups are not related: Mengen is an Austronesian language, while 
Sulka is classiﬁed as a Papuan isolate with long connections to neighboring languages (Gordon [ed.] 
2005; Reesink 2005). 
3 Figure 8 in the recent publication State of the Forests of Papua New Guinea (Shearman et. al. 2008: 21) 
shows the dramatic increase in areas allocated to the logging industry from 1980 to 2005. Interestingly, 
substantial portions of the forests of southern Wide Bay were designated as production forests in 2005 
(Shearman et. al. 2008: 21).
4 Raskol is a Tok Pisin term for young men engaged in criminal activities such as hold-ups, rape and 
murder.
5 We em bai much cheaper. Na bilong kamapim developman bai i no givim mipela any danger. I gat ol 
narapela alternatives. (…) Say, laik mipela i improvim ol ports tasol. Na mipela i usim sea transport na sotsot 
distances long rot tasol, laik mipela hia long [village name].
6 Ol i pastaim wokim sampela haus bilong ol police, bihain ol i wokim rot i link. (…) Em nau, ol police nau 
em bai sanap bilong (…) rausim ol desla man nogut nau. (…) Mipela i no inap rausim, bikos mipela i save 
poratim ol tu.
7 Em rotlink... bikos company ya, company i ... no wokim gut ol bris... i kisim, katim ol diwai na putim tasol 
long warai... Na i no govaman... [sa]pos govaman, bai mekim gut... na company em... em i no inap mekim 
gut. (...) Govaman, em bai wokim gut, bikos em wok bilong en olgeta taim...
8 Em bai putim kliapela piksa long ol lain we i nogat graun. Laik they are only using user rights long 
graun.
9 Information yu givim out long ol... ol big man long yu bipoa bipoa... ol tumbuna bilong yu yah, ol lain 
ken usim desla information na twistim twistim araun. (…) Some people are becoming clever these days. Pasin 
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bilong bipoa, i no mo stap. (…) That’s why people are... ol i no laikim disclosim information bilong ol, for 
fear of that.
10 This fear was voiced by some of the people I spoke to, especially in connection with government 
conservation of the Nakanai Ranges. Some inhabitants were concerned that if the government conserves 
the ranges, the Tolais—who are, for demographic reasons, a majority in the provincial government—will 
take control of the area.
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